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DAVID G. EBNER*
Smaller Exploration Companies on the
International Frontier
ABSTRACT
The increasing interest in foreign oil and gas exploration presents
unique challenges for domestic oil and gas lawyers. The familiar
world of title examination is completely absent where oil and gas is
owned by governments, and knowledge of oil and gas lease terms is
unavailing where rights are granted under concessions, production
sharing contracts, risk service contracts and hybrid agreements.
Knowledge of foreign tax laws, direct investment laws, and
specialized international arbitration methods is necessary, together
with knowledge of domestic laws with extraterritorial impact.
Ultimately, international oil and gas law is as much international
as oil and gas law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The domestic oil and gas industry is not dead, or even dying. Daily
oil and gas production in the United States is currently greater than any
other producing country in the world and natural gas production is second
only to the Russian Federation. An even more convincing sign of the
industry's health is its continuing ability to sustain fads and follies, like the
recent Lodgepole play in North Dakota, the current offshore interest in deep
Gulf of Mexico waters, and the seemingly irresistible temptation to drill
new coalbed methane wells even where past wells have performed
dismally. Greater operating efficiencies, improved technologies, and a
willingness to expend very substantial amounts for exploration and
development have each contributed to the strong growth in the domestic oil
and gas industry over the past several years.
For a number of reasons, however, smaller independents are not
fully participating in this resurgence. These independents traditionally
impact the industry through their willingness to participate in grass roots
exploration. But, the number and relative attractiveness of domestic
exploration opportunities are diminishing for these companies. To a lesser
extent, land use and environmental protection constraints are gradually
tightening on smaller companies, especially as they seek to develop fee
* David Ebner is an attorney practicing in Denver, Colorado at Lohf, Shaiman & Jacobs,
P.C.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
lands near expanding urban centers or federal lands in national forests or
other environmentally sensitive areas. Finally, those areas that are open and
accessible often require exploration and exploitation technologies that are
quite expensive, well beyond the financial means of smaller companies.
Consequently, many smaller independents are beginning to look
overseas, applying their relish for risk and the nimbleness which comes
from their small size to undertake preliminary exploration, with a view to
discovering a prospect which either may be proven on a shoestring or
farmed out to a larger company. Some of this interest in overseas activity
may simply be a fad, the willingness to follow the lead of others when faced
with limited information, but the entire movement should not be dismissed
as a fad.
The driving force behind this movement is the tremendous
imbalance between the extensive exploration that has occurred in the
United States and the relative lack of exploration in many other countries.
This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the vast majority of reserves
remaining to be discovered will be discovered outside the United States.
The current interest in international exploration is not motivated primarily
by negative characteristics within the United States legal or economic
environment, but by the much more positive geological environment
abroad. This geological fact is not something that will change.
Geologists, geophysicists and other technical personnel already
have the skills necessary to undertake exploration overseas. The geology
may be different, but the methods used to identify and evaluate that
geology are the same as in the United States. For lawyers, however, the
movement abroad is a sea change. If, as Bruce Kramer suggests the skeletal
structure of oil and gas law is property law,' that entire structure is lost
when a company undertakes foreign operations. Oil and gas in place in
most countries outside the United States is, with only the most rare and
isolated exceptions, owned by the government. Consequently, all of the
knowledge held by competent oil and gas lawyers relating to title
examination, correlative rights, implied covenants, and similar matters
becomes wholly irrelevant in dealing in an environment where the mineral
ownership is clear, uniform, and unchanging.
What does become relevant is a myriad of unfamiliar international
law matters. Moreover, the countries most likely to be of interest to small
exploration companies are precisely the ones where these legal issues may
be the least developed, least accessible, and least stable. The entry price for
stable areas like the United Kingdom, Norway, France and Indonesia often
is too high for small companies, since competitive bids in such locations
1. Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Law Don't Mix: The Mangling of Common
Law Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 541 (1994).
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fully reflect available knowledge, established infrastructure, and political
stability. Small exploration companies are therefore drawn to what may be
bypassed or overlooked portions of developed areas or, with increasing
frequency, to frontier areas which previously have been avoided by larger
companies because of legal uncertainties or perceived political risk. Indeed,
without having enjoyed a great deal of exploration attention in the past,
these frontier countries themselves may be unsure of the fiscal regime and
legal requirements which should be applicable to oil and gas exploration
and development.
Providing legal assurance in such an unfamiliar and uncertain
environment is a formidable undertaking. Experienced oil and gas lawyers
do, however, bring an understanding of the industry, its exploration and
development techniques, its economics, and the way it does business. In
addition, the major integrated oil companies have been operating abroad
for nearly a century, resulting in a wealth of available literature and a num-
ber of specialized journals, services, and organizations which may guide the
negotiating and drafting process and provide the information necessary to
understand key concepts. Although these resources are available, it remains
true that, just as domestic oil and gas law is a type of advanced property
law, so too is international oil and gas law a type of advanced international
law. It requires at least as much knowledge of public and private inter-
national law as knowledge of the oil and gas industry.
II. THE HOST COUNTRY LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Most analyses of international oil and gas contracting begin with
the proposition that reviewing applicable provisions of the host country
constitution and its law governing petroleum activities, together with
applicable regulations, are the first and most important steps in counseling
a company. However, a close review of the model contract often provides
a clearer and more concise vision of the organizing principles of the
country's contracting system. For that reason, I often prefer to begin with
a review of the country's model form contract. Whichever comes first, a
review of the host country law must be conducted at an early date to
identify the contracting system, award procedures, the provisions which
lawfully may be changed by negotiation and, perhaps most importantly, to
ensure that negotiations are conducted with the properly authorized
governmental department. In some countries, like Cameroon,2 negotiating
2. Alexander Ekollo Moundi, Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in Cameroon: Some
Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects, 12 OIL & GAS L & TAX'N REV. 181,182 (1994); George K.
Ndi, The Contractual and Legal Framework for Petroleum Exploration and Production in Cameroon,
10 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 267,270 (1992).
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power may have been delegated by the government to its national oil
company, a corporate enterprise wholly or partially owned by the
government. In other countries, like the former Soviet Union during its
turbulent transition years,3 there may be considerable uncertainty as various
state companies and governmental departments maneuver for authority to
negotiate such contracts.
The host country's constitution and petroleum laws establish the
framework of the negotiations because neither a ministry nor national oil
company may disregard the governing law or grant exploration rights
contrary to its legal authority.4 Nevertheless, in many deep frontier
countries it is possible to negotiate a contract containing provisions contrary
to the law, and then have the contract itself obtain the force of law. This
may be done through enactment by the legislature or, if the law permits,
through governmental approval of the contract and subsequent publication
in the official gazette. Such changes can sometimes be approved and
adopted in frontier countries with surprising ease, although the time
required to secure all necessary action may stretch from months to years.
Curiously, while the legal framework underpinning a particular
transaction may sometimes be changed, it is usually very difficult to change
the basic structure of a model contract. This is another reason why I prefer
to examine model contracts even before the law itself. The model contract
was likely developed by the country in cooperation with an outside con-
sultant such as the World Bank, Commonwealth Advisory Service or some
other public or private entity. In any event, the consultant likely was highly
respected by the country, worked hard on the model form, and produced
a document which will not lightly be discarded.' Substantial provisions of
that contract may be added, modified or even vitiated in the negotiation
process, but is exceedingly difficult to move entirely away from a model
form and begin life anew with an entirely different contract structure.
A company usually generates its first interest in a particular
country by a visit of its technical personnel to an international conference,
trade show or the country itself. Accordingly, technical people should
request as much legal information as possible, in English if available, as
soon as they identify a serious interest in the country. Copies of the
3. Dirab Doeh & Annie Williams, Oil and Gas: Doing Business in the USSR, 8 OIL & GAS
L. & TAx'N REv. 374, 376 (1990). This uncertainty continued for years following the
independence of the various Republics. See, e.g, Martin Friedrich, Petroleum Investment in
KazaAhstan, in INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS INVESrMENT (Thomas W. Wilde & George K. Ndi,
eds., 1994).
4. MICHAEL P. DARDEN, LEGAL R!EsARCH CHECKLISr FOR INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
OPERATIONS 21 (ABA SONREEL Monograph Series No. 20 1994).
5. Gerald Padmore, Tax Negotiations in Mining Ventures: A Government Perspective, in
THE TAXATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES 195 (James M. Otto ed., 1995).
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petroleum, tax, and foreign investment laws, as well as any applicable
regulations, the model contract form, and any promotional summaries
concerning investment in the country should be sought. These materials
may also be obtained by direct inquiry to the concerned government, but
the typically written nature of such queries, possible language barriers, and
other bureaucratic complications may substantially slow the process. A
personal request at a conference or trade fair, together with a subsequent
confirmation letter, almost always brings satisfactory results. Of course,
such materials may be obtained by retaining a local agent or legal counsel
in the host country, but this in turn raises the difficulties of locating a
suitable person and incurring premature expenses.
A company should obtain these full text documents directly from
the host country to ensure that it is working with the most current and
accurate information possible. As an interim measure, reliable summary
information may be secured from World Petroleum Arrangements
published biannually by Barrows Company Inc. in New York, or from
World Petroleum Laws published annually (and supplemented quarterly)
by Petroconsultants, S.A., in Geneva. A number of journals, including the
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, Oil & Gas Law and Taxation
Review, Petroleum Economist, and others may have country-specific
information which can be located through periodical indices, but such
publications may lack the depth of full text and may not be current. Full text
laws are available through Barrows' Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, but even
this very useful service lacks applicable regulations and suffers the
possibility that its version of the law may not be current. Although they
ultimately lack the certainty and comprehensiveness of primary source
materials obtained directly from the host country, each of these secondary
sources can provide a sound initial orientation, as well as very useful
descriptions of recently negotiated contract terms.
III. CONTRACT FORMS
Most contracts between host countries and companies granting
exploration and development rights fall into one of three basic categories:
concessions, production sharing contracts, or risk service contracts.6 There
certainly are other arrangements in use, but virtually all petroleum con-
6. A fourth category, participation agreements, is suggested in ERNEsr E. SmI ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 349-58 (1993). These agreements employ a joint
venture or joint operating agreement structure to place the host country and company on a
very nearly equal footing. While they are very commonly used after a commercial discovery
has been made, they are relatively infrequent as a method of granting initial exploration
rights.
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tracts may be understood by reference to one of these three principal class-
ifications. Indeed, the differences among these three principal types of con-
tracts are, upon close examination, largely differences of appearance, pro-
cess and style, which have come about for historical, rather than commer-
cial, reasons. Every agreement, regardless of classification, shares a common
intent to afford a company the ability to explore and develop and to afford
the host country with appropriate compensation for the rights granted.
A. Concessions
The defining moment for international petroleum concessions was
the grant at the beginning of this century to William Knox D'Arcy of the
exclusive right to conduct oil exploration in much of Persia for a 60-year
period. As compensation for this breathtaking privilege, Mr. D'Arcy paid
a modest signature bonus in cash and stock and agreed to pay 16% of the
net profits which might be realized from the concession. Considering the
cumulative production from this area and the proven reserves that remain
intact, such consideration now appears ridiculously small. At the time,
however, Mr. D'Arcy was conducting the deepest of deep frontier
exploration in an area of great political risk. While the potential for
commercial oil deposits in Persia was well known, two previous
concessions had ended without obtaining success. He and the backers of his
syndicate took substantial risks and came perilously close to absolute failure
before unlocking the vast petroleum of the Middle East.
Substantial concessions were granted during the first part of the
twentieth century by Mexicos and Venezuela 9 and, after delays occasioned
by the First World War and the intricate maneuvering of investors and their
governments, elsewhere in the Middle East."° These concessions typically
called for very long durations, exceedingly low returns to the host country,
and substantial grants of acreage. Starting in the early 1950's, these
agreements began gradually to unravel, as host country governments
7. Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry, 48
N.Y.U. L. REv. 774, 776 n.5 (1973). The D'Arcy concession was not the first oil
concession-earlier concessions had, for example, been granted in the Dutch East Indies and
even in Persia itself. However, it is the one generally viewed as the model for subsequent
concession structures.
8. Jonathan C. Brown, The Structure of the Foreign-Owned Petroleum Industry in Mexico,
1880-1938 in ThE MEXICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN THE TwENrmTH CENTURY 6 (Jonathan C.
Brown & Alan Knight eds., 1992).
9. JORGE SALAZAR-CARRiLLO, OIL AND DEvELOPMENT IN VENEZUELA DURING THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 36-37 (194).
10. HENRY CATTAN, THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCSSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA 1-3 (1967).
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argued for a greater share of production, for recognition of their sovereign
rights, and for ownership of important facilities and equipment." As the
decades passed, these original concessions were progressively renegotiated
under pressure from the host country governments to provide greater
governmental control over operations and increased revenues. Indeed,
several concessions were ultimately expropriated by the concerned
governments. Consequently, commentators began to speak of the end of the
concession system as a contracting mechanism.
The term "concession" does not have a clear meaning in
international law. To the extent that it is understood as necessarily
involving the outright grant of exclusive exploration and production rights
for a very extended period of time, with very small compensation to the
host country, and without any control by the government over operations,
the concession system is now dead. However, if an oil concession is more
broadly defined as an exclusive grant of exploration and production rights
in exchange for payments to the government based upon production, then
concessions are in fact the most prevalent form of agreement in the world
today. 2
To avoid the negative connotation of the term "concession," these
agreements are now referred to as licenses, tax/royalty arrangements, or
modem concessions. They differ notably from the earliest concessions by
covering much smaller areas (although these areas are still quite large by
United States standards). They also require timely performance of specific
exploration work and relinquishment of lands not proven by a discovery;
provide much larger payments from production to the host country
government; allowing the government some participation in exploration
and development decisions; and often provide the national oil company a
right to back-in for a direct ownership interest, usually a carried interest,
after discovery.13 Many variations exist with respect to the foregoing items,
but the crux of these agreements still grant exclusive exploration and
production rights against payments, in cash or in kind, based on success.
It is important not to minimize the enormous protections afforded
host country governments in these agreements, all of which are vastly
greater than in the original 1901 concession granted to Mr. D'Arcy.
However, the fundamental commercial structure of these modem
concessions-exploration and production rights granted against payments
from production- remains just as it was in the Persian concession.
11. Ksmm BuNN Er AL, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM & EXPLOrrATION AGREEMENTS 46-48
(1986).
12. BARROWS COMPANY INc., 1 WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS 1 (1995).
13. ZHI-GUOGAO, INTERNATIONAL PErROLEUM CONTRACTS 52-57 (1994)(using Thailand's
contracts as an illustrative example of these changes).
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B. Production Sharing Contracts
The widespread reporting of the death of concessions was likely
due to Indonesia's introduction in 1966 of the production sharing contract,
a new form of host country agreement which quickly gained popularity in
many countries throughout the world. 4 Production sharing contracts are
now the second most common form of contracting arrangement in the
world and are used in many of the most important producing countries15
Production sharing contracts begin with a premise of equality
between the host country as owner of the minerals and the company as the
contractor responsible for operations. Such exploration and development
occurs at the contractor's sole risk and expense (often subject to back-in
rights held by the national oil company after discovery). As compensation
for the contractor's efforts, the contractor is allowed to recover its costs from
a specified percentage of total production ("cost oil"), while the remaining
production ("profit oil") is divided between the contractor and the host
country. Royalties are occasionally imposed under production sharing
contracts as well, although it is difficult to find any theoretical justification
for using both production sharing and royalties in the same agreement.
The amounts allocated to cost and profit oil under various
production sharing contracts, even contracts granted by the same country,
can vary tremendously based upon the prospectivity and anticipated
difficulty of a given area. In addition, the share of profit oil attributable to
each may sometimes be adjusted by the size of the reserves, the amount of
production, or a cost recovery factor tied to the profitability measured
against investment. 6 Cost recovery from cost oil can also be adjusted by
ring fencing, a system whereby exploration and other costs may be
recovered only from production in the related discovery area. 7
C. Risk Service Contracts.
Introduced by Venezuela, and used mostly in South America, risk
service contracts are commercially similar to production sharing contracts.
However, they carry the underlying philosophical basis an important
additional step. In a risk service agreement, the contractor acts as the
provider of a service to the host country by exploring and developing that
14. Gordon Barrows, Production Sharing in Indonesia, 1966 to 1993: Evolution and Trends,
11 OiL & GASL. & TAX'N REv. 3 (1993); BUNN, supra note 11, at 69-81 (1986).
15. BARROWS COMPANY INC., 1 WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS 1 (1995).
16. BUNN, supra note 11, at 75-76.
17. GAO, supra note 13, at 78.
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country's resources. In return, the contractor is authorized to receive as
payment for its services a share of production that is often divided between
production which may be used for recovery of costs and additional
production which may be used for a reasonable profit.'s The risk in risk
service contracts is that the contractor must fund all exploration, but
receives its fee only out of production actually obtained. If there is no
production, there is no fee to the contractor and no reimbursement of
incurred costs.' 9 Risk service contracts are consequently very closely akin
to production sharing contracts, but justify the production share due to the
company on a wholly different philosophical basis.
IV. HOST COUNTRY TAXATION
The host country's revenue from petroleum production includes not
only its royalties or share of production under the terms of the contract, but
also the amounts that it receives through taxation. Such taxation may
include income taxes, windfall taxes, or additional profit taxes. As with any
evaluation of tax impact, the important question is the effective tax rate
after consideration of the tax base, available deductions, credits, and other
matters. These inquiries closely involve the lawyer in a detailed
consideration of the host country's internal tax regime.
While income taxes may be the most readily apparent form of host
country taxation, small exploration companies must also give careful
attention to customs duties, withholding taxes, turnover and value added
taxes, excise taxes, and other fees. Import duties, for example, may be
imposed with crippling effect upon the full value of a drilling rig when that
rig is brought into the country. Such duties, however, often may be avoided
at the time of initial contract negotiation if production equipment ultimately
will become the property of the government." Even if this is not the case,
by pointing to the host country's strong interest in having the newest, most
technologically advanced, and most valuable equipment used in operations
the duties may be avoided. The importance of export fees is amply
demonstrated by the Russian Federation's unexpected imposition of export
fees of between $4 and $5 per barrel. This move virtually eliminated the
profit of many producing companies in that country, and continues to
18. Johnnie W. Hoffman, Jr., The Service Contract as a Vehicle for International Petroleum
Exploration and Production, in INTERNATIONAL OIL, GAS, AND MINING DEVELOPm.ET IN LATIN
AMERICA 14-1 (RoCKY MTN. MIN. L FDN. 1994). The company may also be paid in cash,
frequently with an option to purchase production.
19. There are also pure service contracts, by which a host country or a national oil
company retains a company to perform development or other services in exchange for
payment. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 371-73 (1993).
20. GAO, supra note 13, at 48.
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concern both companies and lenders.' These tax impacts sometimes may
be avoided or ameliorated at the time of initial contract negotiation, but
they are much more difficult to change after contract execution. This is a
matter of obvious importance to a small exploration company that hopes
later to interest a larger company in participation in the contract area.
To protect against increased taxation following contract execution,
it is quite common to include a stabilization clause in the contract fixing the
income tax rate for the life of the contract. Such clauses prohibit increases
in the effective tax rate prevailing at the time of contract execution and
provide that any subsequent changes in the taxation level will be non-
discriminatory, imposed by the host country equally upon all industries, or
determined in consultation with the company, with a view to preserving the
anticipated return on capital.' These are difficult negotiations, since the
host country has a legitimate interest in preserving its sovereign powers,
maintaining its flexibility in revenue generation, and avoiding the
possibility that the company will later reap and expatriate enormous profits
without comparable rewards to the host country.3 Conversely, companies
contemplating enormous development expenditures, including
expenditures for equipment that likely will be transferred to the host
country at the end of the contract term, require assurance that their
expectations of economic return will be realized. Simply put, a company
needs assurance that if the host country government later finds itself in a
liquidity crisis, the company alone will not be asked to fund the shortfall.
Some exploration companies seek to obtain a temporary tax holiday
or permanent exemption from income taxation, but this must be carefully
weighed against other contract terms. United States companies are taxed
upon worldwide income. Income taxes paid in other countries generally
may be credited against income taxes due in the United States, subject to
certain limitations which are designed principally to preserve the
effectiveness of the alternative minimum tax and to ensure that credits are
not used to shelter United States income.' Amounts paid to host countries
which are not income taxes or which do not meet the stringent requirements
21. See Russia: Export Routes Need Expanding, PETROLElM ECONOMISr, Apr. 1996 at 51.
22. Samuel K. B. Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment
Process, 28 INT'L & CoM. L Q. 401 (1979)
23. Gerald Padmore, Constitutional Versus Contractual Commitments by Government in
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES LAW 115-1 (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. 1995).
24. I.R.C. § 901(a) (1988). See Richard A. Westin, Taxation of United States Corporations
Involved in Overseas Natural Resources Operations, in Ti TAXATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES
352-367 0James M. Otto ed., 1995). Bilateral tax treaties may also help to avoid double
taxation. See John E. Osborn, Treaties and Other Bilateral Agreements for the Protection of
International Development, in INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR MINERAL
DEvELOPmENT 3-10 (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. 1991).
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for classification as a tax in lieu of an income tax may not be credited.
Consequently, increasing royalties and other amounts in exchange for the
elimination of host country income taxes often may be counterproductive.
Similarly, sophisticated income tax negotiations strategies which turn upon
securing rapid depreciation of capital investment and immediate expensing
of exploration costs may prove too clever if the host country subsequently
decides to create new taxes which are not based on income or profit.
V. CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS
After determining the share of production and production proceeds
to which an exploration company is entitled under the contract, and the
effect of income and other taxes, a company must ensure that its profits may
be repatriated in a freely convertible form of currency. Many countries have
historically enacted restrictive exchange and repatriation measures to assist
in macroeconomic management, to avoid capital flight, and to encourage
reinvestment. While the increasing globalization of the world's economy
has substantially reduced these restrictions, they have not been entirely
eliminated, especially in frontier areas.' Careful consideration consequently
must be given to all aspects of the host country's foreign investment laws.
The clearest and easiest way of avoiding convertibility and
repatriation risks lies in securing appropriate host country guarantees that
oil and, if appropriate, natural gas may be freely exported to a country with
convertible currency, great depth in foreign exchange and relatively
transparent fiscal controls. Even then, such export arrangements may be
foiled by host country requirements. For example, the host country may
require foreign currency earnings first be repatriated to the host country
and converted to domestic currency. The host country may impose export
taxes, or contract provisions requiring that a share of production be sold
into the local market for domestic use, sometimes at prices well below those
available on the world market.2'
Some countries still regulate the timing and extent of repatriation
of capital investment, and different and more restrictive controls may apply
in these and other countries to the repatriation of profits.' Foreign direct
investment often must be registered with the host country government.
Such registration occasionally guarantees or provides favorable treatment
in respect of the ability subsequently to repatriate capital investment
amounts, but often is required simply for statistical purposes. In addition,
25. Blinn, supra note 11, at 168-176; PHmLW R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL LAw 174-
190(1995).
26. Blinn, supra note 11, at 176-77.
27. ZouIAm A. KRONPOL, PROTrEcnoN OF FoREIGN INvssrmENT 50-51 (1972).
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repatriation of profits may be subject to additional taxes or may actually be
limited to a specific percentage of profits or capital. Conversion of local
currency also may be limited by law, both as to amount and as to the
permissible site of such conversion, or simply by the availability of foreign
currency. Even if currency convertibility is possible, it may occur at
unfavorable rates.
Subject to compliance with International Monetary Fund policies,2
the best protection lies in carefully drawn contract provisions by which
matters of concern to the company are expressly guaranteed by the host
country government. This is especially true where such host country
guaranties are supported by the terms of a bilateral investment treaty
between the United States and the host country.'
VI. CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
A. Government Take
The combination of a host country's share of production under the
contract, whether as royalties, a share of profit oil, or the amount which
remains after payment of fees under a risk service contract, together with
income, windfall, additional profit, and other taxes, plus signature,
discovery and production bonuses, is collectively referred to as
"government take." 3 Without a complete analysis of both the contract terms
and the effective tax rate, it is simply not possible to determine the
attractiveness of a prospective opportunity. Several consulting services
provide helpful reports describing the relative attractiveness of the fiscal
regimes in various countries,3 but the increasing competitiveness among
countries seeking exploration and production investment requires specific
consideration of applicable tax laws at the time each contract is negotiated.
28. Section 2(b) of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, Dec. 17,1945,60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (1947), provides that exchange
contracts entered into in violation of foreign exchange regulations are unenforceable.
29. Bilateral investment treaties, where they exist, provide substantial comfort not only
in matters of foreign exchange, but also in respect of compensation for expropriation,
dispute resolution, and waivers of sovereign immunity. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 225-76 (1994).
30. Carried participation by the national oil company may have a significant impact
upon contractor take and consequently should be analyzed as a part of government take. D.
Johnston, Contractor/Government Take: Old Concept-New Terminology, 14 OIL & GAs LAw &
TAX'N REv. 143,145-46 (1996).
31. Petroconsultants, S.A., for example, publishes the REVIEW OF FISCAL REGIMEs,
updated semi-annually; Barrows Company Inc. includes a World Fiscal Systems for
Oil-Comparison of Favorability in its WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS (1995).
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The expropriation and contract renegotiation experiences in South
America and the Middle East remain so vivid that most commentators insist
that negotiations be carefully conducted to ensure final contracts that will
withstand subsequent political objection in the host country. This advice is
underscored by the recent announcement by Ecuador that one of its modem
risk service contracts is to be unilaterally terminated and replaced with a
new joint action contract providing a greater return to the government.32
Announcements of this type, whether they ultimately lead to contract
termination or renegotiation, are chilling to companies contemplating
foreign investment. Surely the best deal for an exploration company is a
deal which will yield appropriate compensation to both the host country
and the company itself and, most importantly, which will continue without
unanticipated upheavals in contract terms.
Exploration companies who hope later to interest larger companies
in purchasing their operations should remember that contracts are more
easily renegotiated to provide a greater, rather than a lesser, government
take. Although it is never possible to predict the final project size, cost and
revenue if a discovery is made, it is clear that the mandatory contract terms
concerning government take will define which discoveries will be
commercially viable and which will not. Consequently, while there is every
reason to encourage fairness in all negotiations, there is also very good
reason not completely to lose sight of a certain measure of self interest and
self protection. For example, the currently applicable terms in many
important Colombian contracts afford the government such a large share of
production after considering tax impacts that the commercial viability of
even the largest fields is threatened.' Renegotiating these contracts to
reduce the government take will involve obviously difficult, time
consuming and politically charged discussions, and may ultimately prove
impossible.
B. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Among the applicable United States laws new to domestic
exploration companies is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [HEREIAFTER
FCPA]. The FCPA is a simple piece of legislation whose brevity belies the
great difficulty of its application. The law is structured in two parts,
including various accounting procedures applicable to publicly traded
companies.' and more fundamental anti-bribery requirements applicable
32. WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,1996, at A2.
33. LATIN AMERIcAN ENERGY ALERT, July 15,1996.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994).
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to all United States companies and all natural persons who are citizens,
nationals or residents of the United States.'
The anti-bribery provisions generally prohibit any person from
directly or indirectly offering, giving or paying anything of value to any
officer or employee of a foreign government for the purpose of corruptly
influencing any act or decision by such foreign official or corruptly inducing
such foreign official td use his influence to affect any decision or action of
the government in order to obtain or retain business. The FCPA contains a
specific exception for routine governmental action, as well as further
exceptions in the nature of affirmative defenses. These exceptions include
payments legal under the written laws or regulations of the host country,
and reasonable and bona fide expenses associated with the promotion,
demonstration or explanation of products and services and expenditures
relating to the performance and execution of a contract with a host country
government. Similar prohibitions and exceptions are applicable to
contributions, gifts and payments to political parties and candidates.
The foregoing summary is neither comprehensive nor complete, but
it does provide a reasonable initial outline of the FCPA's proscribed
conduct. 6 The propriety of specific conduct turns upon careful
consideration of the exact language of the full statute, which is slightly
illuminated by a number of reported judicial decisions and a much smaller
number of review procedgre releases issued by the Department of Justice.37
The statutory language is perhaps more fully illuminated by an internal
moral sense. There are no regulations providing guidance under the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA.
, Like other legal regulations that arguably are grounded on a moral
plane, the anti-bribery provisions regulate behavior which ranges in
gradation from clearly illegal to clearly legal. There is no accessible bright
line demarcation distinguishing permissible from impermissible conduct.
The FCPA conveys an intuitive sense that the outright delivery of a cash
payment to a government official in exchange for a contract award is
wrong. Indeed, even in those jurisdictions where such payments are
anecdotally reported as commonplace, it is impossible to locate written
permission for such payments under local law. Thus, the affirmative
defense accorded to written local law is largely illusory. This is true because
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77dd-2 (1994).
36. See generally DONALW R. CQvER, COMPLYING WFT THE FOREGN CORRUPr PRACTICES
AC (1994).
37. The judicial decisions are reported and the releases summarized in BUSINESS LAWS,
INC., FORmGN CoRRuir" PRAcncES ACT REP., a three volume service which also provides
useful articles and commentary relating to the Act.
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most countries decry such payments on a public policy level, even if these
payments are widely understood to occur on an everyday basis.
The FCPA also prohibits the use of an agent to effect a prohibited
payment. By extension, a company's recognition of the high probability that
a prohibited payment will be made to a foreign official. For example, an
agent's request for an excessive fee for its services or explanation that an
additional fee is necessary to complete all necessary arrangements often is
an indication that such payment will be improperly applied and therefore
unlawful.' A responsible company may avoid these problems by
establishing through appropriate representations, warranties and
covenants, its insistence that such improper payments not occur. Such a
corporate policy may be made meaningful by continuing inquiry and
vigilance.
The prohibition upon payments through an agent also extends to
payments to an agent or other conduit for a foreign official. One common
indication of this illegal purpose is an insistence that a contract will be
awarded only if a specific entity, other than a recognized national oil
company, is included as a local partner. Foreign investment laws sometimes
require that a percentage of the license interest be owned by a domestic
entity, but a demand that such interest be owned by a specific entity is a tip-
off that the interest may be intended for a foreign official.
Importantly, the FCPA in no way prohibits the hiring of a local
agent, even a local agent with great private influence upon the
government.3 The desirability of a particular local agent is entirely
dependent upon that agent's knowledge of local procedures and his access
to important decision makers. As the agent's level of knowledge and access
increase, so too does the likelihood that the agent may be related a foreign
official subject to the FCPA. There is, of course, no express prohibition upon
retaining and paying a member of the official's family, so long as it is
certain that amounts paid to him will not be channeled to the government
official. The prohibition against payment to officials, however, certainly
extends to officials with responsibilities outside the natural resources
licensing area if they are retained to influence government action. The
former is difficult to discern, and the latter difficult to uncover, except
through express and well communicated representations and warranties.
38. See 1 BUSINIs LAWS, INC., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACICES AcT REP. at 103.024, et seq.
(1996)(list of red flags derived from Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange
Commission releases).
39. Lucinda A. Low, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Laws to the Interests in Natural
Resource Projects in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL OIL, GAS AND MiNING DEvELoPmsNT IN
LATIN AMERICA 3-13 (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. 1994).
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The two exceptions that exist in the nature of affirmative defenses
raise similar problems. Paying the expenses of a foreign official while on a
due diligence trip to the United States to verify the company's operations
on behalf of his country is, even if a modest per diem is paid for everyday
expenses, quite appropriate under the reasonable and bona fide business
expense defense.' As per diem expense reimbursement, type of lodging,
and entertainment quality escalates, however, the company may be caught
between the foreign official's insistence that such treatment is
commensurate with his status and a quite natural hesitation that the
resulting extravagance is exceeding reasonable reimbursement. In such
circumstances, the amounts ordinarily afforded as similar expense
reimbursement by a company to its employees and outside contractors may
provide a guide.
In those cultures where gift giving is an important social practice,
written local law may expressly authorize the relatively low monetary value
gifts which are employed on these occasions. Even without specific written
authorization, comfort may be obtained from the commonplace nature of
the exchange, since the FCPA bars only transfers which are made with a
corrupt intent or purpose. Although the FCPA has no threshold amounts (it
covers anything of value), the same logic covering de minimis gifts in
United States corporate practice should apply with equal force
internationally since gift exchanges which are culturally routinized are not
done with any corrupt intent, but rather to conform with local custom.4'
Finally, the FCPA precludes transfers to foreign officials, not
governments. In certain cases, a governmental agency will request
computers, fax machines, vehicles, or technical training in the course of its
relationship with an exploration company. In dealing with such requests,
the important thing is truly to believe that the item will be received and
retained by the government, and not diverted for personal use. Transfers
made to the government itself before contract execution are not materially
different from a signature bonus paid to the government upon contract
execution.
The foregoing discussion provides only general guidance, since the
law itself has so few clear demarcations between legal and illegal conduct.
Like so many other elements of international practice, the FCPA is not
within the normal scope of a domestic oil and gas lawyer's practice and
requires a certain amount of study and understanding before the question
arises.
40. FCPA Review Procedure Release 85-1 (July 16, 1985); FCPA Review Procedure
Release 83-2 (July 26,1983); FCPA Review Procedure Release 83-3 (July 26,1983).
41. Barry A. Sanders, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Antibribery Provision, in 1B THE LAW
OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACIONS §18.04[1][a][i] (Ved P. Nanda, ed. 1996).
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VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Many United States exploration companies fear having contract
disputes judicially resolved in the host country. These fears stem from
concerns that the judicial and executive functions are not sufficiently
separated in the host country or that the local courts may be unduly
influenced by the government. Indeed, even if there is a clear separation of
powers and a truly independent judiciary, the potential impact of a decision
adverse to the host country may be so devastating to the national economy
as to create an impression of possible bias against the exploration company.
There are also concerns over publicity, due process, the absence of
knowledge of other countries' local judicial procedures, and an inherent
uncertainty as to the possible future direction of the local judicial system.
Finally, whatever the source of concern, there is something to be said for
making dispute resolution equally inconvenient, uncertain, and expensive
for all of the parties concerned. This not only creates a level playing field,
but also creates a strong incentive amicably to resolve differences. This
often can best be accomplished by selecting arbitration in a distant, neutral
jurisdiction.
Host country governments prefer dispute resolution through their
own courts for reasons of public policy and national pride. Even so,
arbitration in a neutral country is increasingly accepted as a compromise
means of formal dispute resolution. In South America, for example, the
historical impact of the Calvo Doctrine, while certainly not dead, appears
to be receding as more and more South American countries are willing to
participate in foreign arbitration. 2 Certainly, no country lightly undertakes
a decision to have matters pertaining to its natural resources decided in a
final and binding fashion by outsiders, but most countries do understand
the hesitation of exploration companies to subject themselves to local courts
in matters of contract interpretation. With appropriate assurances of
fundamental fairness, neutrality and impartiality, many more countries are
42. The Calvo Doctrine, formulated by Carlos Calvo in the nineteenth century, provides
that foreign nationals doing business in a country should be treated in the same fashion as
the citizens of that country, and consequently that disputes should be resolved locally and
without foreign involvement. The wide acceptance of this doctrine in Latin America required
the use of local courts, or sometimes local arbitration, for more than a century, and continues
in some countries to this day. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Arbitration in Latin America:
Overcoming Traditional Hostility, 5 ARB. ItL. 137 (1989). In countries where the doctrine
lingers, like Bolivia, it may be possible to use neutral arbitration within the host country
itself. See R. Blain Andrus, The Use of Arbitration Provisions in Latin American Agreements, 12
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 139,141 (1994).
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now agreeing to include arbitration clauses in their exploration and
production contracts.
The increasing emphasis in the United States on alternative dispute
resolution has made more domestic oil and gas lawyers aware of the nature
and structure of arbitration clauses than was true just a few years ago.
Nonetheless, international dispute resolution has some very important
differences from the arbitration procedures generally used in a domestic
context.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The historical right of a sovereign state to be immune to
proceedings or execution against it arises under principles of comity, by
which countries refuse to permit their courts to entertain actions against
foreign governments. While these principles of comity would not appear to
bar arbitration proceedings, the better practice is to include a specific
waiver of sovereign immunity in connection with arbitration proceedings,
as well as judicial efforts to enforce any arbitration award.
In the absence of an express contractual waiver, two theories are
often advanced to establish a government's waiver of its immunity: first,
that the inclusion of an explicit arbitration clause in a contract negotiated
and executed by a government reflects such government's consent to both
the concerned arbitration and, by extension, enforcement of a resulting
award;' and second, that sovereign immunity generally is not applicable
under the increasingly more common restrictive view of immunity, by
which proceedings or execution against sovereign states are prohibited only
where the activity is of a governmental, rather than a commercial, nature."
In addition to these theories, the United States is a party to many bilateral
investment treaties with specific countries which recognize arbitration as a
proper dispute resolution mechanism and which expressly waive assertion
of sovereign immunity defense.4 The U.S. is also party to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, by which ratifying countries may be found impliedly to
have waived sovereign immunity as a defense to enforcement.
Since explicit waivers of sovereign immunity are universally
recognized, it seems a needless risk to rely upon implied waivers when the
43. PAUL H. VSH, 2 GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW §12.06 (1995).
44. ESA PAAwViwA, PARrIcIPATIoN OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS at 182-191
(1990) (considering the special problems associated with the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources).
45. See Sornarajah, supra note 29, at 225-76.
46. Done June 10,1958,21 U.S.T. 2517.
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entire risk of a sovereign immunity defense may be extirpated by a few
sentences.47 The validity of such waiver must, of course, be checked against
applicable local law. In the rare case where the waiver is contrary to law, it
should be approved by necessary legislative or other governmental action.'
Ensuring that the persons or entities executing the contract have the power
to bind the host country to the waiver may require appropriate inquiry at
the very highest levels of the government.
B. Applicable Treaties
There are a variety of treaties and other international agreements
which may bear upon the use of international arbitration. This is true not
only in connection with sovereign immunity defenses, but also in
connection with the availability of various arbitration procedures and
judicial enforcement of resulting awards. These treaties include bilateral
investment treaties between the United States and the concerned host
country,49 the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"),' the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
("Panama Convention"),,' and the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States "World
Bank Convention". 2 The World Bank Convention established the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") for
conciliation of arbitration of disputes between foreign investors and
governments or government entities.
C. Arbitration Procedures
After reviewing applicable treaties and determining that sovereign
immunity has been waived by express or implied consent, the issue of
47. Georges Rene Delaume, Contractual Waivers of Sovereign Immunity: Some Practical
Considerations, 5 IcslD REv. 232 (1990).
48. There is substantial authority for disregarding technical objections concerning
compliance with local law procedures if the contracting party was led to believe that the
waiver would be effective by the host country. See KLAUS PETER BERTER, INTERNATIONAL.
ECONoMIc ARBITRATION 185-87 (1993).
49. Gudgeon, Arbitration Provisions of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: AvOiANCE AND SErmMNT 41 (Seymour J. Rubin & Richard W.
Nelson, eds., 1985).
50. Done June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517.
51. Done Jan. 30,1975,104 Stat. 448 (1990).
52. Opened for signature Aug. 27,1965,17 U.S.T. 1270; see generally MOSHE HIRScH, THE
ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTvEEN OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTEs (1993).
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specific dispute resolution procedures becomes paramount. In this regard,
the first issue is determining whether to employ ad hoc or institutional
arbitration.' This unfamiliar concept relates to the use of rules adopted by
an international arbitration organization, usually the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules,' but with administrative procedures handled by the
parties themselves (ad hoc arbitration) or by the use of an international
organization's arbitration rules, together with its full appointment, support,
and interpretative facilities (institutional arbitration). All such institutions,
including ICSID, the American Arbitration Association, the International
Chamber of Commerce, and others have published clauses that they believe
appropriate in conferring jurisdiction. The most difficult decision faced by
a United States exploration company is balancing the high costs associated
with institutional arbitration against the greater complexities and
uncertainties associated with ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration can be
equally effective and much less expensive than institutional arbitration, but
there are many more drafting traps for the unwary in arranging ad hoc
arbitration. For example, it is vitally important that ad hoc arbitration
clauses specifically identify an appointing authority like the International
Chamber of Commerce or London Court of International Arbitration, which
can formally appoint the arbitrations and resolve challenges to proposed
arbitrators.
Use of a recommended submission clause does not end a lawyer's
responsibility, since several more aspects must also be considered. For
example, many companies will decide their preference for arbitration based
upon the perceived confidentiality of arbitration procedures, even though
there is nothing in any of the recommended submission clauses requiring
confidentiality. If confidentiality is important, it must be explicitly added
to the concerned contract. Specific provision as to the location of the
arbitration proceedings is also important, both to ensure that the arbitration
is held in a country which is a party to the New York Convention or has a
similar agreement allowing enforcement of the award and to ensure that the
country has an arbitration law which minimizes the possibility of judicial
interference with the arbitration proceedings. Explicit language is often
included in international agreements prohibiting judicial review of the
arbitral award in all or only very narrow circumstances. However, such
provisions are useless if the parties have selected a country that does not
recognize such clauses as the situs of their arbitration.
53. William K. Slate, II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference, 31
WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 41 (1996).
54. 31 U.N. GAORSuPP. (No. 17) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976); see generally ISAAK I
DORE, THE UNCRITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993).
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Finally, consideration is often given to procedures relating to
language, expense of the arbitration, number of arbitrators, pre-hearing
discovery, and, perhaps most importantly, governing law.
D. Governing Law
Whether disputes are resolved judicially or through arbitration, one
critical concern is the applicable substantive law. The use of local law is
sometimes required by host country law and cannot be changed by
negotiation. If the governing law may be changed, many exploration
companies seek to do so because of the perceived bias in favor of the host
country government or the relative thinness of the law concerning
petroleum exploration and production issues. Where possible, companies
may attempt to avoid these concerns by using the law of another country
with greater experience in oil and gas issues or by internationalizing the
agreements through use of applicable laws widely used in petroleum
producing countries. Both approaches are helpful, but both may suffer
substantial drawbacks.
Many domestic oil and gas lawyers are aware of the United States
principle of conflict of laws that governing laws may not be selected which
have no relation to the parties or the concerned transaction. Oklahoma law,
for example, may not easily be selected to govern the relationship of Texas
and Colorado companies drilling for oil and gas in New Mexico. The rules
governing the choice of law in international agreements are much more
forgiving on this point, allowing the selection of an unrelated third
country's laws to govern the parties' relationship in situations where the
host country has little experience adjudicating such issues. These choice of
law rules require that there be a reasonable basis for the selection of the
concerned law, most commonly where the country whose law is chosen has
a substantial relationship with the parties or transaction, but may also be
encountered where a party is "contracting in countries whose legal systems
are strange to them as well as relatively immature."' Nonetheless, a
selected governing law may still be avoided if it contravenes an important
public policy of the host country.' Selecting the law of a third country as
the governing law is relatively easy where arbitration, rather than litigation,
is employed in a litigation setting.57
In situations where host country law need not be used as the
governing law and where the parties cannot reach agreement on another
55. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187, Comment f (1971).
56. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187(b) (1971).
57. Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARv. L.
REv. 1816,1817-18 (1988).
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country's laws, it may be possible to internationalize the contract by
agreeing to apply applicable laws widely used in petroleum producing
countries.I Such provisions are not without drawbacks, since they consider
not only laws used in developed countries, but also the laws of many
developing countries. Moreover, the practical effect of sorting through these
laws and determining which provisions are commonly shared or widely
applicable is an obviously difficult and expensive task requiring substantial
expert assistance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It appears certain, given the potential rewards associated with the
vast unexplored areas of the world, that the future course of oil and gas
activity for smaller exploration companies will increasingly be directed
overseas. As a necessary corollary, the future course of oil and gas law will
increasingly involve international oil and gas law which, paradoxically, is
neither oil and gas law as most practitioners now know it nor as most law
schools now teach it.
This article merely scratches the surface of the complex interplay
among United States, foreign and international law, omitting some
important topics, such as the impact of United States antitrust and export
control laws and of local training, employment and technology transfer
laws, while addressing other topics only briefly. Even this brief introduction
to international oil and gas practice amply demonstrates, however, the need
for broadening our understanding of the nature and scope of oil and gas
law. Happily, the long experience of major international companies
provides a rich source of knowledge that is accessible through available
publications. The transmission of that experience and knowledge to a new
generation of practitioners and students will be an increasingly important
task in the coming years.
58. Stephen Hancock, Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements, 8 OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 399,402-04 (1990).
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